After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War
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Numar articol:187801002
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Specificatii
The writings of Carl von Clausewitz loom so large in the annals of
military theory that they obscure the substantial contributions of
thinkers who came after him. This is especially true for those
German theorists who wrote during the half century preceding World
War I. However, as Antulio Echevarria argues, although none of
those thinkers approached Clausewitz's stature, they were
nonetheless theorists of considerable vision. The Kaiser's
theorists have long been portrayed as narrow-minded thinkers
rigidly attached to an outmoded way of war, little altered since
Napoleon's time. According to this view, they ignored or simply
failed to understand how industrialization and modernization had
transformed the conduct of war. They seemed unaware of how numerous
advances in technology and weaponry had so increased the power of
the defensive that decisive victory had become virtually
impossible. But Echevarria disputes this traditional view and
convincingly shows that these theorists--Boguslawski, Goltz,
Schlieffen, Hoenig, and their American and European
counterparts-were not the architects of outmoded theories. In fact,
they duly appreciated the implications of the vast advances in
modern weaponry (as well as in transportation and communications)
and set about finding solutions that would restore offensive
maneuver to the battlefield. Among other things, they underscored
the emerging need for synchronizing concentrated firepower with
rapid troop movements, as well as the necessity of a decentralized
command scheme in order to cope with the greater tempo, lethality,
and scope of modern warfare. In effect, they redefined the
essential relations among the combined arms of infantry, artillery,
and cavalry Echevarria goes on to suggest that attempts to apply
new military theories and doctrine were uneven due to deficiencies
in training and an overall lack of interest in theory among younger
officers. It is this failure of application, more than the theories
themselves, that are responsible for the ruinous slaughter of World
War I.
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